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1 Introduction 
 
 Today, mainstream economics prides itself on its mathematical rigour and deploys 
mathematics to an enormous extent as indicative of disciplinary acceptability, thereby policing the 
exclusion of other forms of economics to an extraordinary degree. How this situation came about, and 
with what consequences, are addressed in the next section, highlighting the extent to which the use of 
mathematics has promoted a particular content within economics, one that has shifted only in its 
expanding scope of application since the formalist revolution of the middle of the last century. This sets 
the context for the main goal of this contribution, to assess the extent to which formal problems within, 
and not of, mathematical reasoning itself set constraints on what can be achieved within mainstream 
economics. In particular, mathematics has found it necessary to negotiate the consequences of Russell’s 
paradoxes, laid out in Section 3. Placing mathematics on sound foundations is found to have potential 
implications for, or limitations on, what can be achieved with mathematics in its applications. In 
particular, as argued in Section 4, for an economic theory based on methodological individualism, there 
are severe limitations upon the extent to which social properties can be consistently addressed – 
whether micro can be legitimately extrapolated to macro. In this light, the concluding remarks 
indulgently reflect on the likely continuing neglect of the implications for economic theory of Russell’s 
paradoxes despite our best efforts. 
 
2 Formalism and Content in Economic Theory 
 
 Mark Blaug (1999, 2001 and 2003) has dubbed the period between 1945 and 1955 as one in 
which economics went through a “formalist revolution”. There is no doubt that this decade does mark a 
watershed in the evolution of the discipline, and it is readily recognisable that use of mathematical 
presentation (and statistical techniques) ratcheted up in that period. It also gathered such a momentum 
that formal mathematical presentation is now taken as essential in what are perceived by orthodoxy to 
be all of the leading journals. As a major player in that formalist revolution, Debreu’s (1986, p. 1265) 
commitment to formalism with economics, in a sense, as a conceptual add on, could not be plainer: 
 
An axiomatized theory first selects its primitive concepts and represents each one of them by a 
mathematical object … Next assumptions on the objects representing the primitive concepts 
are specified, and consequences are mathematically derived from them. The economic 
interpretation of the theorems so obtained is the last step of the analysis. According to the 
schema, an axiomatized theory has a mathematical form that is completely separated from its 
economic content. If one removes the economic interpretation of the primitive concepts, of the 
assumptions … its bare mathematical structure must still stand. 
 
 But, as argued in Fine (2007), the formalist revolution not only signified a turning point in the 
form taken by economics but also in its content and, especially, in its scope. From the marginalist 
revolution of the 1870s to the formalist revolution, the thrust of mathematical economics was to extract 
as much juice out of the idea of the optimising (supposedly “rational”) individuals as possible in the 
context of supply and demand for the market. This entailed an almost exclusive reliance upon calculus 
as far as technique is concerned, still much the same today, and the desire to obtain results took 
precedence over more or less everything else. This is true of the notion of rationality itself, reduced to 
maximisation of utility or, even more narrowly, a logic of choice over bundles of goods. Other motives 
and aspects of individuality, let alone social influence over interdependent preferences, were set aside 
as an inconvenience. Even for Robbins (1932, p. 87), notorious for his definition of economics as the 
allocation of scarce resources between competing ends, “economic subjects can be pure egoists, pure 
altruists, pure ascetics, pure sensualists or – what is much more likely – mixed bundles of all of these 
impulses”. There is a fair bit of individual character to ponder in this but it was soon to be discarded. 
Yet as Waller (2004, p. 1112) puts it in review of Davis (2003), “But if choices are the only 
characteristics of atomistic individuals, the theory of the individual becomes so reductionist that it 
ceases to be about human beings”. For Davis (2007, p. 203) himself, “if the basis of the atomistic 
individual was its inner life, and that inner life is now black-boxed into non-existence, then it follows 
that this neoclassical individual also ceases to exist”. In addition, as emphasised by Hutchison (1998) 
around the time and by Lawson (1997) most recently, economic methodology was reduced to 
deductivism from these reduced axioms of individual economic behaviour.  
 
 Prior to the formalist revolution, the process of establishing these mathematical techniques 
involved what might be described as an implosion as the explanatory content and scope of application 
was diminished to the narrowest determinants of supply and demand. This left enormous scope for 
alternative forms of economics to prosper, not least Keynesian macroeconomics but also a whole range 
of approaches that would now be dubbed heterodox, then to a degree the orthodoxy of their time 
although now marginalised within the discipline. In addition, just to establish the technical apparatus 
associated with the optimising individual, essentially the now ubiquitous utility and production 
functions, the rise of mathematical methods within economics inevitably withdrew content from, and 
contact with, the other social sciences whose methods, theories and variables would have undermined 
the rationality enterprise.  
 
Following the formalist revolution, the scope of application of the technical apparatus began a 
process of expansions. From a logical point of view, its principles, such as utility maximisation, are 
universal. So, once established in form and content as lying at the heart of the discipline, it was 
inevitable that the traditional confinement to (aggregate) supply and demand on the market should be 
breached. There began a process of colonising the discipline, so much so that Lucas (1987, p. 108) 
could claim, “the term ‘macroeconomic’ will simply disappear from use and the modifier ‘micro’ will 
be superfluous”, cited by Davis (2003, p. 35). And the forward march of microeconomic principles was 
also extended to other disciplines as the optimising individual became perceived as engaged in pursuit 
of self-interest across all activities, economic or otherwise. As argued by Fine and Milonakis (2009), 
such economics imperialism has gone through two phases. The first, with leading representative Gary 
Becker, perceived all economic and social life as if the consequence of optimising behaviour and as if 
perfectly markets were present. The second phase still draws upon the idea of economic rationality but 
with the non-market as the rational response to market imperfections. 
 
In short, economics created a mathematical technical apparatus in order to solve a particular 
problem of its own making, embracing huge qualifications along the way. These have now been 
conveniently forgotten in applying the technical apparatus as widely as possible. How, and with what 
confidence, this is now done is strikingly revealed by Demsetz (1997, p. 1). He opens, “The strong 
export surplus economics maintains in its trade in ideas and methods with the other social sciences is 
an important indicator of the success of economics. Not much has been said about the source of this 
success, but it has been attributed largely to advantages offered to other social sciences by the 
economics tool kit … The emphasis here is on the broad scope of the phenomena that can be explained 
by our tool kit”, emphases added. Further, he continues by boasting of the achievements of the 
discipline, “Economics may be judged the more successful social science because it has explained 
phenomena within its traditional boundaries better than the other social sciences have explained 
phenomena within their respective traditional boundaries. The primacy of economics may be 
established in this sense even if economics never influenced the other social sciences”, p. 2. 
 
Such sleight of hand in using the economist’s hammer to slice, as it were, the social scientist’s 
bread would be impossible but for the orthodox economist’s failure to respect knowledge of 
methodology and history of their own discipline, and to question a false stylised belief that their own 
practice emulates that of the natural sciences. Thus, significantly, in his defence of orthodoxy, 
Dasgupta (2002, p. 57) opens by confessing that, “Most economists … have little time for the 
philosophy of economics as an intellectual discipline. They have even less patience with economic 
methodology. They prefer instead to do economics … There is much to be said for this habit … I know 
of no contemporary practicing economist whose investigations have been aided by the writings of 
professional methodologists”. Further, neglect of history of economic thought is justified by reference 
to the methods of the natural sciences, “You can emerge from your graduate studies in economics 
without having read any of the classics, or indeed, without having anything other than a vague notion 
of what the great thinkers of the past had written”, for “She reads Ricardo no more than the 
contemporary physicist reads James Clerk Maxwell”, p. 61.2 
 
 The corresponding drive to mathematical deductivism in principle, and its particular content in 
practice, can be seen to be a reflection of one side of Polanyi’s double movement in the rise of 
capitalism, disembedding homo economicus from society. Significantly, it is the rise of capitalism that 
prompted social theorists from Weber through Marshall, Schumpeter, Parsons and Polanyi to accept the 
creation of an alienated economic self-interest as a social driving force, appropriately to be isolated and 
studied on the basis of methodological individualism (in contrast, for example, to the evolutionary and 
institutional schools of economic thought associated with Veblen). But each, if in a different way and 
to a different extent, denied that such economic analysis could exhaust economics let alone social 
science. For Parsons, for example, sociology was to be distinguished from economics by its method 
and not by its subject matter. And with the subsequent rise of economics imperialism following the 
formalist revolution within economics, Polanyi’s double movement is unconsciously parodied by re-
embedding the social within the economic. In addition, the isolated project of extracting the technical 
implications of economic rationality was wedded to the more widespread emergence of modernism and 
analytical philosophy, in which as much thought and reason as possible is reduced to formal 
mathematics, thereby creating a dualism between the rational and the irrational (the artistic and the 
cultural for example). But, as a precondition, the same principle applied to mathematics itself. Could it 
be reduced to a coherent axiomatic and deductive system as the basis for its application to the natural 
or social worlds? Such was the problem posed for analytical philosophy in general and for the 
philosophical foundations of mathematics in particular, with Bertrand Russell to the fore. 
 
3 Russell’s Paradoxes 
 
In 1950, Bertrand Russell was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature. He might more 
appropriately have been honoured with the Prize for Peace, given his ardent commitment to the 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Yet, intellectually, his greatest contribution has been in 
philosophy for which there is no Nobel Prize. In particular, he is remembered for his paradoxes and 
their implications for the logical foundations of mathematics. 
 
 The purpose of this contribution is to examine the implications of Russell’s paradoxes for 
economic theory. It has, after all, become highly mathematised. And, not surprisingly, there has been 
considerable debate over the appropriate contribution that mathematics can make to economic theory, 
especially from those adopting an increasingly marginalised heterodox position.3 Criticism of 
mathematical methods has been heavily concerned with whether their application to economics 
imposes limitations on the scope and content of theory or whether it is, or can be, purely a facilitating 
device for clarity and rigour. For Marshall, followed by Keynes, for example, mathematics served at 
most as an aid to clear thinking and not as a model or representation of the real world. Subsequently, 
focus of debate has been on the axiomatics and formalism of mainstream economics, as realised in its 
reliance upon the deductive method, together with its increasing reliance upon mathematical modes of 
rhetoric and a particular set of technical assumptions, Backhouse (1998). By complete contrast, 
attention here is focused on the almost neglected issue of the inner limitations of mathematics itself as a 
deductive method, prior to its application to economics, and the implications of these intrinsic 
limitations for economic theory.  
 
This is where Russell’s paradoxes are relevant.4 For, whatever the merits of mathematics in its 
application to economics, these are pre-conditioned by the limits of mathematics itself as a logical 
system, a matter that has tended to be entirely overlooked in the (methodology of) economics 
literature.5 Thus, there are problems, or limitations, within as well as of deductivism even as a 
mathematical method. 
 
 The most popular form in which Russell’s paradoxes are known is through the following 
proposition: “the ship’s barber shaves all those on board who do not shave themselves”. The 
conundrum is that if the barber shaves himself, it follows that he does not, and vice-versa. The 
proposition would appear to be self-contradictory.  
 
 It is now generally accepted that this paradox is mere word play, a trick of language. The 
paradox can be resolved by denying the existence of such a barber, just as we can easily construct an 
inconsistency by assuming both A and not A. But Russell’s paradoxes in set-theoretic terms are more 
challenging. Let S be the set of sets that do not belong to themselves. Then if S does belong to itself, it 
does not, and vice-versa. Inconsistency arises once more. To resolve it barber-wise would be to require 
that the set S does not exist, not a matter of semantics but a genuine limitation on our freedom to define 
the existence of sets.  
 
 One way of interpreting this conundrum, standard within mathematical logic, is in terms of an 
incompatibility between two different ways of defining sets. Sets can be defined in terms of their 
properties or sets can be defined by the individual elements they contain – greenness, for example, as a 
property, as opposed to collecting objects together that happen to be green. As each of Russell’s 
paradoxes demonstrates, these two approaches are incompatible. We can define whom the barber 
shaves in terms of individuals or in terms of (not) shaving but not both. And we can define sets by their 
members or by their properties (belonging to or not) but not both without limit for risk of 
inconsistency. 
 
Thus, an immediate way out of the paradoxes is to separate the elemental (what belongs or 
membership) notion of set from the relational (what property or class) notion. In other words, the 
paradoxes arise because, contrary to our intuition that these two approaches might be compatible, it is 
not possible to lump them together as a mutually consistent way of defining sets. As Gödel (1983, p. 
452) puts it, Russell has the effect of “bringing to light the amazing fact that our logical intuitions (i.e., 
intuitions concerning such notions as: truth, concept, being, class, etc.) are self-contradictory”. In short, 
mathematics itself does not allow us a free hand in the formation of “sets”, by free use of both 
elemental membership and relational property. 
 
This, then, raises the question of exactly how far we can go in extending the 
elemental/individual/membership definition of sets to incorporate the relational/properties/class 
definition without re-introducing Russell’s paradoxes, or vice-versa. Gödel points out that Russell saw 
resolution in “two possible directions … which he called the zig-zag theory and the theory of 
limitations of size, respectively, and which might perhaps more significantly be called the intensional 
and the extensional theory. The second one would make the existence of a class or concept depend on 
the extension of the propositional function (requiring that it be not too big), the first one on its content 
or meaning (requiring a certain kind of ‘simplicity’, the precise formulation of which would be the 
problem)”, p. 452/3. Put more simply, we do not allow all sets to be defined whether by elements or 
properties without restriction. This might be done by excluding sets that belong to sets and so 
consideration of those that do not belong. Thus, “The paradoxes are avoided by the theory of simple 
types”, clarified in a footnote as, “individuals, properties of individuals, relations between individuals, 
properties of such relations, etc … Mixed types … are excluded”, emphasis added. He continues, “That 
the theory of simple types suffices for avoiding also the epistemological paradoxes is shown by a closer 
analysis of these”, p. 455. A weaker solution, due to Zermelo, would be that, “the sets are split up into 
‘levels’ in such a manner that only sets of lower levels can be elements of sets of higher levels”, p. 459.  
 
 This way of proceeding has become known as the iterative (or extensional) concept of set as 
opposed to the intensional. As Wang (1983, p. 537) suggests: 
 
The iterative concept of set is of course quite different from the dichotomy concept which 
regards each set as obtained by dividing the totality of all things into two categories (viz. those 
which have the property and those which do not). 
 
In this light, Wang (1983, p. 541) identifies two different responses to the paradoxes, the “bankruptcy 
(contradiction) or misunderstanding (error)” theories. For the error approach, sets are perceived not to 
have been properly understood. Hence, the goal is to “uncover flaws in seemingly correct arguments” 
by restricting the definition of a set more in conformity to intuition, as for Zermelo and the iterative 
method, p. 542. For the bankrupts, basic intuition is contradictory and can only be salvaged by ad hoc 
devices such as Gödel’s appeal to Russell’s notion of simple types, where mathematical requirements 
or, more exactly, restrictions are imposed to preclude paradoxes. For Wang, in interpreting Gödel, there 
is a shift in position from misunderstanding/error to bankruptcy/contradiction corresponding to the shift 
from the foundations of mathematics to the more general logic of truth, concept, being, class, etc. 
Mathematics as such requires something like the iterative conception of sets in order to preclude 
contradictions but without thereby restricting the mathematical properties that are sought. But to 
impose such restrictions outside mathematics to a more general subject matter would be arbitrary. 
Indeed, “The full concept of class (truth, concept, being, etc.) is not used in mathematics, and the 
iterative concept, which is sufficient for mathematics, may or may not be the full concept of class … In 
relation to logic as opposed to mathematics, Gödel believes that the unsolved difficulties are mainly in 
connection with the intensional paradoxes (such as the concept of not applying to itself) …  In terms of 
the contrast between bankruptcy and misunderstanding  … Gödel’s view is that the paradoxes in 
mathematics, which he identifies with set theory, are due to a misunderstanding, while logic, as far as 
its true principles are concerned, is bankrupt on account of the intensional paradoxes”, p. 537/8.  
 
Now Benacerraf and Putnam (1983, p. 4) adopt a more tempered tone than the “bankruptcy 
(contradiction) or misunderstanding (error)” approach of Wang referring, respectively, to reformists 
and apologists. For them, “Inevitably, the reformers and the apologists rub elbows. But the distinction 
is a vague one and we should not try to make too much of it”. From a formal point of view, both sides 
need to offer restrictions on set formation in order to avoid contradiction. The issue is whether such 
restrictions are functional (allowing mathematics without in-built inconsistency), intuitive (apparently 
reasonable), or appropriate (to the subject matter other than mathematics but to which the mathematics 
is being applied). But what is clear is that the extensional, iterative (individualistic) approach is only at 
most demonstrably acceptable for the pure science of mathematics. Once it is extended to other areas, 
such as truth, concept, being, class, etc, the restrictions needed to provide the foundations for 
mathematics have neither intuition nor basis. As Boolos (1983, p. 490) puts it, citing Russell (1959, p. 
80): 
 
These theories appear to lack motivation that is independent of the paradoxes in the following 
sense: they are not, as Russell has written, “such as even the cleverest logician would have 
thought of if he had not known of the contradictions”. [Thus] a final and satisfying resolution 
to the set-theoretical paradoxes cannot be embodied in a theory that blocks their derivation by 
artificial technical restrictions on the set of axioms that are imposed only because paradox 
would otherwise ensue; these theories survive only though such artificial devices. 
 
Put another way, mathematics can be rescued from the paradoxes by the iterative concept of set. But, 
there are other ways of resolving the paradoxes, those giving emphasis to the intensional as opposed to 
the extensional approach for example, each with its own properties and restrictions, Fine, K. (2006). 
But, in applying mathematics outside of its own immediate domain, the restrictions needed to avoid 
paradoxes should be specific and appropriate to the object of analysis involved. In a nutshell, 
underpinning consistency to ensure that 2+2=4 is not the same thing as dealing with the conceptual 
foundations of the natural or the social sciences. 
 
4 Implications for Economics 
 
 But it is precisely the application of mathematics to economic theory that is under scrutiny. 
Does it make sense to limit the formation of sets to some form of iterative concept in the context of 
economic theory? Or is some other resolution required of Russell’s paradoxes? Consider the new 
institutional economics. In a useful, if necessarily partial, overview of the evolution of the new 
institutional economics and a survey of its current state of play and prospects, Richter (2005, p. 171), 
himself the longstanding editor of the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, appropriately 
suggests that it is primarily based upon mainstream neo-classical economics: 
 
the foundation stones of the NIE are the same as those of neoclassical economics: 
methodological individualism and individual rational choice given a set of constraints. 
However, due to transaction or information costs, information is limited and thus institutions 
matter. 
 
As will be familiar to all academic economists, this means that the NIE accepts the importance of 
institutions but seeks to explain them, to endogenise them, albeit on the basis of aggregating over the 
optimising behaviour of individuals, this behaviour itself potentially modified in light of informational 
constraints and historically evolved institutions (and possibly other exogenously given motivations and 
limits on calculation). In short, there is a presumption that something, the institutional, exists 
independent of, but connected to, individuals. The latter both form the institutional and respond to it.  
 
In this respect, there is a sharp difference with the old institutional economics (and the vast 
majority of non-rational choice social science) for which the institutional, and the social more 
generally, make up the analytical starting point. Not surprisingly, mainstream economics has displayed 
scant respect for such alternatives but has increasingly sought to reconstruct it on the basis of its own 
methodology, such is the nature of the current phase of “economics imperialism”, Field (1979) for an 
early recognition of this and Fine and Milonakis (2009) for a full discussion. Of course, the new 
institutional economics displays much more in motivation and content than relying exclusively upon 
rational choice. As such, it adopts mixed methods around individual and social behaviour. This still 
leaves open whether these mixes are mutually consistent when fully explored for their logical 
implications. 
  Interestingly, if necessarily inadvertently, Benacerraf and Putnam (1983, p. 28) pinpoint 
precisely the way in which the iterative concept of set parallels that of methodological individualism 
because, for the former, “there is some relation of ‘priority’ that is transitive, irreflexive, and 
asymmetrical, and such that the members of any set are always prior to the set”.6 That the extensional, 
in set theory, should prevail over the intensional, has its counterpart in methodological individualism – 
the elemental individual has priority over the social relational, structural or whatever. In other words, 
the institutional derives from the priority of the individual over the higher level without total feedback 
(reflex and symmetry).7 If the latter are allowed, paradoxes are liable to ensue. Is it possible, however, 
to formalise this correspondence between the foundations of set theory and (the new) institutional 
economics?  
 
 At first blush, even a casual perusal of the literature will reveal that there is ambiguity over the 
definition of what constitutes an institution, in the NIE and more broadly. The reason for this is 
relatively simple as it is an immediate consequence of an approach based on methodological 
individualism. Institution becomes a metaphor for all non-individualistic aspects, so it ranges over 
everything from collective action to ideology. But, putting this aside for the moment, an institution 
must, at the very least, involve more than one person if only in the limited sense of an individual at 
least reacting with something, if not necessarily somebody, else. Institutions can, for example, be 
impersonal, and relate to each other.  
 
 For the sake of simplicity for the moment, assume that society consists of just two people, a 
and b. In terms of forming an institution, whether it be mutual respect of property rights or common 
language or custom, then there is, in the first instance, only one option. This is the institution made up 
out of membership by both a and b. This is readily expressed in set-theoretic terms by {a, b}. Subject 
to the content of the institution, left unspecified for generality, does this fill out the institutional 
structure of this elementary society as there are no other sets of individuals other than the individuals 
themselves {a} and {b}? 
 
 The answer is no and the reason for this is that both a and b, as individuals, can relate to the 
institution {a, b}. This might appear to be fanciful. Why not consider a’s or b’s relations to {a, b} to be 
part and parcel of the institution of {a, b} itself? First, there are logical reasons why not – the set {a, b} 
is distinct from the set {a, {a, b}}, or {b, {a, b}} and {a, b, {a, b}} for that matter. More intuitively, 
{a, b} is an institution to which its constituent members a and b can relate. If the institution {a, b} is 
the one of language for example, a and b do not simply talk to one another, they also relate to the 
language itself independently of talking to one another. Otherwise, of course, the language could never 
change, as for it to do so depends upon a for example seeking to change {a, b} – or, more exactly, the 
(here unspecified) institutional content attached to {a, b}. And the same applies whatever is the 
institutional substance attached to {a, b}, custom, property rights, ideology, and so on. In any case, 
more generally than for our two-person society, institutions, I and J say, also interact with one another 
to form the higher level institution, {I, J} which, in membership terms, would be made up of a set of 
sets.  
 
Thus, it would be an impoverished notion of institutions, and of institutional structure as a 
whole, if the only institutions considered are collections of individuals.8 For Douglass North, for 
example, one theory of the state is that it may represent the interests of the monarchy but the 
institutional structure depends upon how the governed customarily respond to corresponding property 
rights, ultimately rebelling against them when incentives to do so are strong enough, Fine and 
Milonakis (2003and 2008) for a critical exposition. If the state and its citizens did not together 
constitute a higher level institution, the one could never be overthrown by the other whether for reasons 
of allocative efficiency, shifting property rights, or ideology.  
 
Somewhat differently, Stiglitz (1989, p. 21) asks, “in what does the government have a 
comparative advantage?”, and answers in terms of its distinctiveness as an institution, namely that 
membership is universal and that the state has powers of compulsion, presumably over its citizens at a 
higher level than their membership of it alone. In other words, not only is the state embroiled 
institutionally with its citizens (and, presumably, other lower level institutions), it also has a 
relationship (of compulsion) to them by parallel with the intensional notion of set. In this case, the 
institutional structure includes the state and its citizens and the powers of compulsion. This is, in 
Gödel’s term a mixed type and should be ringing alarm bells. But such mixed types are common within 
institutional economics as theory, and empirics, moves seamlessly between individual members and 
their behaviour and properties connecting them. In Peck’s (2005) terms, it is all a bit “dirty”.9 
Nonetheless, once again, it is apparent that the literature does, absolutely correctly, perceive institutions 
in formal terms as embodying a complex set-theoretic content and not simply sets of individuals. 
 
In this respect, Akerlof’s work is particularly illustrative. He moves unquestioningly between 
social norms and the like and individual conformity to them to a greater or lesser extent. We have both 
the social and the individual, the extensional and the intensional in set-theoretic terms. There is a 
presumption that these are consistent with one another. But consider the specific example of (the 
economics of) identity addressed by Akerlof and Kranton (2000). By appeal to the metaphor of 
choosing to be red or green, groups (ie sets of individuals) are formed, extensional. But identity is a 
property, greenness or redness, intensional. Whatever its other merits as a theory of identity (and it falls 
foul of what the meaning of identity is and how it is constructed and construed), the approach is caught 
out by Russell’s paradox. Perhaps the easiest way to see this is in terms of the set N of those who do 
not have an identity. They do then, of course, have the identity of not having an identity! Be this as it 
may, individuals surely relate to a property of identity as well as constituting themselves in relation to 
it.10 Of course, like the barber, such a non-identity as identity could be excluded. But what other 
identities are necessarily precluded by constructing them in the individualistic way deployed by 
Akerlof and Kranton. And why should the individualistic prevail over the relational notion, and why 
are the two not seen to be potentially incompatible? 
 
But we digress from the point of motivating the more formal idea that the institutional 
structure of our simple society potentially includes at least the following {a, {a, b}}, {b, {a, b}} and 
{a, b, {a, b}}, together with our two individuals {a} and {b}.11 But we have no reason to stop at this 
point. The defining characteristic of an institution, or the social more generally, is that it relates to other 
institutions (and to individuals). Consequently, we can carry on building up institutions indefinitely. 
Linguists might study our current set of sets just listed, but they might form themselves into a 
professional institution, and they themselves might be studied by educationalists, governing and 
funding bodies, and so on. In principle, even on the basis of a two-person society, the potential for 
institutional structure grows indefinitely. An institution of the sets just listed can form a new institution, 
similarly with these, and so on … 
 
 At what point do we call this process to a halt as surely we must in order to be practicable, 
although it should be observed that maximal institutions are liable to be the most powerful, not the 
most marginal in that they condition all others? For the sake of argument, let X be some sort of 
maximal institution (that might not be unique as in a system of nation-states that can be constituted in 
different ways in making up the system of nation-states). We might have the abstract notion of the state 
in mind for example, or ideology, custom or culture. Now if X is to have any effect on society, it must 
interact with other institutions or individuals, with a say, just as individuals interact with the state, 
custom or culture. Otherwise, we do not have an institution as such, only its constituent members, 
totally disconnected from “society”. In other words, (lower level) institutions and individuals have to 
interact with an institution; otherwise it is an institution in name alone. It follows that {X, a} is an 
institution, contradicting the presumption that X is maximal.  
 
 In other words, it follows that the institutional structure is boundless. Is this some sort of 
trick? If I relate to the state, this relationship is a super-state to which I also relate and so on. The 
problem is that if we both base ourselves on methodological individualism and wish to construct an 
institutional structure that is distinct from the individuals themselves, that institutional structure does 
expand without limit. If it did have a limit, an individual could not relate to it without creating a 
contradiction. And, otherwise, if individuals do not relate to the highest level of institution, it is not 
clear how that institution could ever change or be replaced. Of course, we could fall back upon the 
infamous position of Mrs Thatcher, that there is no such thing as society just a collection of individuals 
(or families). But this would be against the spirit of the NIE which seeks to construct a notion of 
society distinct from, but built upon, its individuals. In other words, if we try and get, as it were, at the 
institution “from below”, through the aggregate interactions of individuals, and by analogy with the 
iterative or extensional conception of set,12 then we are unable to obtain institutions with relational 
properties without potentially generating inconsistency.  
 
 Does this matter? Consider now a society made up of any number of individuals. As before, 
an institution is defined by the agents that make up its constituent membership, and who interact with 
one another, with individuals as starting point. Let I be a set of institutions a member of which is 
defined by its not being a constituent member of itself. Formally, I = {i: i belongs not to i}. Does I 
belong to itself or not? If it does, then I is an institution that belongs to an institution (itself) and so it 
does not belong to I by definition. If, however, I does not belong to itself, then it does belong to itself. 
Either way we have an inconsistency. In other words, by allowing all possible institutions to be built up 
out of constituent elements (or individuals), we create a contradiction in constructing an institution that 
neither interacts with itself nor does not interact with itself. By analogy with responses to Russell’s 
paradoxes, the extensional and intensional definition of institutions are mutually inconsistent unless 
subject to restrictions. But it is not clear why we should prohibit certain types of institutions at the 
outset, even without knowing what they would be, just in order to avoid set-theoretic inconsistency. 
Nor would it appear to be reasonable, both in principle and in practice within the literature, to resolve 
this conundrum purely in favour of the extensional approach, thereby denuding the institutional of 
generic properties as reflected in the notions of custom, ideology, compulsion, culture, identity, and the 
like. 
 
 As a further, specific example, consider the case of money. This is often thought of as an 
institution from a variety of perspectives. It involves trust, financial organisations and governance, 
customary practice, and so on. Money raises two issues – what it is and how does it arise? It is also 
attached to a social property, as is recognised in the terminology of liquidity. From the perspective of 
methodological individualism, money arises out of accumulated acts of (potential) exchange. The 
liquidity of a particular good, m, say, is represented by the goods with which it can always exchange 
{g1, g2, … gn,…}. Typically, money in general is more broadly exchangeable against other goods and so 
attached to larger sets in this respect, with non-moneys only exchangeable with moneys. As is 
recognised in the definition of money in practice, some moneys are more liquid than others, and 
moneys may have different, if overlapping, spheres of exchangeability. Sometimes credit cards will 
serve where cash will not, and sometimes only cash will do. And, in principle and in practice, some 
moneys exchange not only against goods but against other moneys, so such moneys are exchangeable 
against goods and the set of goods that represents the liquidity of other moneys. Thus, some moneys 
will not only dominate others but also be able to purchase them and not necessarily vice-versa. In this 
respect, m1, say, can be considered to include m2, say, in its exchangeability set which is itself 
representative of an exchangeability set. Once again, the institutional structure of money is comprised 
of sets of sets and not just sets of goods. 
 
 Now liquidity, as mentioned, is a social property reflecting capacity to purchase and, by the 
same token, inability to purchase. So application of the notion of liquidity must allow for both liquidity 
and illiquidity. Accordingly, let M be the set of moneys (or goods if you prefer) that are not liquid with 
themselves. Does M belong to itself? If it does, it does not and vice-versa. We have an inconsistency as 
before. Expressed in terms of the social property of liquidity, if a money is liquid, it can buy anything 
including its own capacity to purchase. This will contradict any notion of money/liquidity built up out 
of its constituent or elemental acts of exchangeability, since a “maximal” money will be self-
contradictory, both able and unable to purchase its own capacity. This is not so fanciful as it seems. Is 
there a banknote that could purchase all other liquidities? We suspect not because it would have to be 
able to purchase itself and more, and so be more valuable than itself! Or, to put it more mundanely, if I 
were rich enough (and all logical possibilities need to be allowed), I could purchase the right to issue 
US dollars, contradicting the dollar as ultimate (or maximal) currency as it were, since I could then 
create a newer, bigger currency with greater properties of exchangeability. In short, as before, there are 
three points here that can be made explicit. The first is that generic and individualistic notions of 
liquidity are mutually inconsistent. When economists of a neoclassical bent talk about assets being 
more or less liquid, we have to ask them less liquid than what, and they can only answer by excluding 
certain types of liquidity that have remained unspecified.13 At least a super money (can purchase 
anything) must be excluded for the acceptability of a theory of liquidity based on methodological 
individualism (since it cannot purchase itself and remain super). Second, this exclusion is only a partial 
solution since we do not know what other sorts of (potentially differing sets of) non-individualistic 
forms of liquidity need to be excluded on this basis. Third, the mainstream and more proceed oblivious 
of these inconsistencies and requirements, and simply presume compatibility between individualistic 
and relational notions. 
 
4 Broader Considerations 
 
 The results of the previous discussion are very simple and can be derived formally at least by 
virtue of a few lines of set theory alone. What comes in addition is offered more by way of background 
and motivation for what is after all, the loosest and most general definition of an institution (merely 
those who participate within it). Of course, the mathematical results, as opposed to their institutional 
interpretation, are not new. Significantly, as seen, the issues concerning the relative merits of 
individualistic or elemental and holistic or property approaches have themselves been debated within 
the mathematics and philosophy literature in ways that shed considerable light on the case for and 
against methodological individualism. Indeed, it is only necessary to make marginal changes to the 
language used in transposing arguments from the mathematical/philosophy/natural science domain to 
that of the social sciences.  
 
 In the specific case of institutions, or the social more generally, the iterative or individualistic 
approach is entirely inappropriate. It would mean that individuals have priority that is irreflexive and 
asymmetrical, precluding a full portfolio of feedbacks from institutions to those individuals. Or 
institutions are confined to simple types for which (more or less arbitrary) mixed types are excluded. 
Or institutions at a higher level cannot interact with those (and individuals) at a lower level. Surely 
intuition of what comprises an institution would rule out such artificial devices, not least because the 
cleverest of neoclassical economists would not have thought of them other than in order to rule out 
contradictions. More generally, if economics confines itself to the iterative conception, equivalent to 
mathematics as pure science as opposed to its intuitive application to the real world, then it cannot 
proceed beyond the deductive tautologies or mathematical truths to appropriate knowledge or logic of 
the economy and its institutions consistently. 
 
 Thus, with Russell’s paradoxes translated into institutional terms, we cannot without 
restriction both have institutions based on methodological individualism and institutions defined by 
their social properties. This does not mean that methodological individualism is refuted but it does 
imply that it cannot be extended to address institutions in a way that allows for social properties 
independent of those individuals. In this sense, Russell’s paradoxes offer the conclusion of the general 
impossibility of the new institutional economics. Institutions cannot be derived that have social 
properties other than as a collection of individual interactions, unless certain institutional forms are 
precluded at the outset on the non-institutional grounds of pre-empting mathematical inconsistency. 
The alternative is to reject the element-based approach, or methodological individualism, and begin 
with properties, or social relations, independent of their individual elements, that is a systemic or 
holistic approach. This is, of course, anathema to mainstream economics and offers one explanation, or 
motivation, for why the implications of Russell’s paradoxes for (the new institutional) economics 
should not have been explored despite the pride of place that mathematics and logic are purported to 
occupy within the mainstream. 
 
5 Concluding Remarks 
 
As misundertandings have arisen in comments on earlier versions of this paper, it makes sense 
to emphasise what it does not seek to do. It does not seek to resolve Russell’s paradoxes, to provide a 
contribution to the philosophical foundations of mathematics (or, indeed, to assert that these are either 
necessary or unavoidable).14 Nor does it establish a position on the relationship between mathematics 
and either economic theory or the economy. Nor do we disprove the possibility of methodological 
individualism and its application to the new institutional economics in pure or mixed forms. Rather, the 
intention is merely to point out the implications of certain arguments within set theory for the logical 
(in)consistency of deploying mixed notions of micro and macro, of the individual and the social or 
relational. In this sense, the paper is both more and less general than is suggested by its title (motivated 
by a dramatic intent). For the critique is of methodological individualism as a whole and not just 
neoclassical economics, and there is no impossibility as such as opposed to the observation of 
unrecognised restrictions on what can be achieved in principle and, on occasion, in practice as notions 
of the state, identity, liquidity, institutions and so on are deployed in what are mutually inconsistent 
ways (for Stiglitz’s notion of the state, for example, if all belong but the state has power of compulsion, 
how can the state ever change?!).  
 
Nor it should be added, am I claiming that the corresponding consequences are in some sense 
the most powerful form of criticism of the mainstream either in principle or in practice.15 They derive 
from axiomatics, other critiques do not, but have been overlooked. This does suggest, however, that 
what drives mainstream economics is not mathematical rigour or logic as such but these only in so far 
as they are consistent with an unquestioned set of techniques that are all too familiar – those involving 
optimising individuals, with given production and utility functions, and in search of equilibrium, for 
example, Moscati (2005).16 The technical apparatus is hedged with convexity assumptions and the like 
that the unsuspecting economist would not have thought of but for the need to grind out equilibrium 
with efficiency properties. This is the key to how the mainstream will react to this contribution or how 
it would respond to Russell’s paradoxes if brought to their attention. They will simply be ignored, or 
observed only in passing on regardless often with accompanying misinterpretation, as for all 
contributions that do not conform to continuing use of standard techniques.17  
 
This is not to say that the mainstream has been totally free of considerations that arise from 
the potential inconsistencies between extensional and intensional methods. These are exposed as 
extensive analysis from the individual exposes its own intensive limitations. It all began with the 
fiction of the Walrasian auctioneer – all price-takers means no price-makers. The problem of liquidity 
has already been discussed. The relationship between micro and macro remains a sore point, 
highlighted rather than resolved by the representative individual, and the same applies more generally 
to the various aggregation problems. Observance in the breach, if not ignorance, has been the fate, for 
example, of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem within social choice theory and, even more destructive for 
much of the intuition of the mainstream, the Cambridge Critique of Capital Theory. Nonetheless, to 
know that we cannot have a social welfare function based on pair-wise comparisons, a theory of 
production and distribution based on aggregate capital, and a theory of the social or institutional based 
on methodological individualism is of continuing critical relevance. Let these results be broadcast 
broadly, especially where the mainstream proclaims its superior rigour and scientific status. As with 
many other aspects, this is to work with notions of mathematics and science that have been rejected by 
mathematicians and scientists themselves for a hundred years and more. 
 
Footnotes 
 
1
 Thanks to my brother Kit, a leading expert in these matters, for pointing to some relevant references 
in the philosophy of mathematics, and to Costas Lapavitsas, Roberto Veneziani and others for 
comments on earlier drafts. 
2
 See Mosini (2007) for the huge difference between economics and the natural science, not least in the 
latter’s inductive checks on the realism of its assumptions and its conceptualisation of equilibrium as a 
state of tension rather than as rest. 
3
 See collection edited by Dow (1998), for example, and Chick and Dow (2001). 
4
 We leave others to investigate the implications of other results within the logic of formal systems, 
such as Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. There is also the issue of what sort of mathematics and 
mathematical assumptions are appropriate to economics – continuity, computability, and so on. See 
Velupillai (2005) for a contribution and other references of interest. 
5
 Giocoli (2005) for a partial exception. 
6
 In their Preface, they note that, “we have tried also to narrow the range of philosophical issues 
discussed in the selection to ones that could most easily be recognized as concerning the philosophy of 
mathematics”, p. vii, so there is little scope for explicit consideration of extension to the social 
sciences. 
7
 Even more simply, for Wang (1983, p. 530), if we substitute institution for set: 
A set is a collection of previously given objects; the set is determined when it is determined 
for every given object x whether or not x belongs to it. The objects which belong to the set are 
its members, and the set is a single object formed by collecting the members together. 
8
 As is recognised in the formal theory of networks, themselves to be considered a form of institution, 
with networking across networks, etc. 
9
 See Fine (1980) and Hodgson (2007) for the failure of methodological individualism in practice for 
always having to assume as prior something as social for individuals to work upon. 
10
 For a more extended critique of Akerlof and Kranton (2000) on this and other issues, see Fine 
(2009). 
11
 It is a moot point whether individuals {a} and {b} are themselves institutions or not. Simple-minded 
ruling out of inner speculation would suggest that a and {a} are the same as one another. But allowing 
reflection from society back upon oneself would forge a difference between the two as an external 
influence, albeit one itself forged presumably out of aggregated individual interaction. The Robinson 
Crusoe metaphor for decentralised general equilibrium, for example, allows for the institution of the 
market independent of Robinson himself but with which he interacts as both producer and consumer. 
No doubt, he also talks to himself. Note that the fanatically consistent purveyor of the economic 
 approach to all social science, Gary Becker (1996, p. 18), is mathematically correct to deny 
individual’s the right to meta-preferences but is formally nonsensical in attaching a lack of reason to 
rationality, Sen (1977)! 
12
 To pursue the analogy, Putnam (1983, p. 310) concludes: 
The real significance of the Russell paradox ... is this: it shows that no concrete structure can 
be a standard model for the naïve conception of the totality of all sets; for any concrete 
structure has a possible extension that contains more “sets”. 
13
 I hesitate to impose such abstract considerations upon the real world but this is precisely what 
financial regulation is about in some respects, defining what or what not might be traded including, if 
taken for granted, the right of regulation. 
14
 See Putnam (1983). 
15
 See Lukes (1968), for example, for a classic critique of methodological individualism. 
16
 And hence a shifting meaning in what is meant by mathematical argument and rigour to conform to 
the dictates of mainstream economics, Weintraub (1998). 
17
 Note the striking parallel with the response of reformists and apologists to Russell’s paradoxes 
(heterodoxy and orthodoxy, respectively, as far as economics is concerned), Benacerraf and Putnam 
(1983, p. 3): 
One way of describing the differences between these two groups is to say that, for one group, 
the epistemological principles have a higher priority or centrality than most particular bits of 
mathematics, and hence can be used as a critical tool; whereas for the other group just the 
reverse is the case: Existing mathematics is used as a touchstone for the formation of an 
epistemology, one of whose conditions of adequacy will be its ability to put all of 
mathematics in the proper perspective. To put it somewhat crudely, if some piece of 
mathematics doesn’t fit the scheme, then a writer in the first group will tend to throw out the 
mathematics, whereas one in the second will tend to throw out the scheme.  
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